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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Charlottesville tragedy illustrates how the First and Fourth Amendments 
can collide during arrests.1 On August 12, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
white supremacists orchestrated a “Unite the Right” rally to protest the city’s 
removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee.2 Anti-racist 
demonstrators also attended the rally to oppose the message of white supremacy.3 
Inevitably, the two sides clashed.4 Violence erupted between the groups, and 
the city declared a state of emergency at 11:28 a.m. that day.5 At 1:42 p.m., one 
of the Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a group of anti-racist 
demonstrators, killing one person and injuring others.6 
The media later criticized the Charlottesville police department for its 
perceived slow response to a rapidly-evolving emergency.7 Such criticism forgets 
that law enforcement officers face a guessing game about the right moment to 
infringe on speech, if at all, especially during a time when violence at protests is 
becoming more common.8 With competing interests at stake—life and death 
versus freedom of speech—police may always face criticism, either for being too 
heavy-handed or not heavy-handed enough.9 
Bright-line Fourth Amendment principles grant police officers great 
discretion to enforce laws.10 For example, most people, if not all, break the law at 
some point in their lives, even if just by jaywalking or driving 5 miles per hour 
 
1. See Charlottesville Attack: What, Where and Who?, AL JAZEERA NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/charlottesville-attack-170813081045115.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the timeline of events during the Charlottesville tragedy). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Peter Hermann, Joe Heim & Ellie Silverman, Police in Charlottesville Criticized for Slow Response to 
Violent Demonstrations, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-
charlottesville-police-response-20170812-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
8.  Martin Kaste, Police Struggle to Balance Public Safety with Free Speech During Protests, NPR (Aug. 
26, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/26/546167516/police-struggle-to-balance-public-safety-with-free-speec 
h-during-protests (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9. Id.; Hermann, Heim &Silverman, supra note 7. 
10.  Katherine Grace Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the Pretext of 
Probable Cause, 51 GA. L. REV. 607, 614 (2017). 
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over the speed limit.11 Of course, officers do not make arrests every time they see 
violations, but they retain discretion to do so.12 While this discretionary power is 
vital to effective law enforcement, it also has the potential for abuse if officers 
make arrests for improper reasons.13 
One such improper reason is a First Amendment retaliatory arrest, which is a 
pretextual arrest to retaliate against a person’s constitutionally protected speech.14 
In most retaliatory arrest cases, the underlying criminal charges are never brought 
or eventually dropped.15 Thus, a civil remedy serves a dual purpose: it is an 
individual’s only real chance at recourse, and it provides a check on government 
actions that might otherwise chill speech without consequence.16 
Though the retaliatory arrest cause of action seems straightforward, a 
majority of courts impose a daunting threshold requirement—to bring a 
retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove a lack of probable 
cause.17 In other words, if probable cause for any crime existed at the time of the 
arrest, a plaintiff cannot recover even if the police officer’s desire to retaliate 
against the speaker was the true reason for the arrest.18 
This harsh result stems from a constitutional tug of war between the First and 
Fourth Amendment.19 At its core, a retaliatory arrest is a First Amendment claim 
because the plaintiff seeks redress for a free speech violation.20 But the Fourth 
Amendment governs arrests.21 In this unique constitutional collision, probable 
cause—a low, malleable, and objective standard that officers wield with 
significant discretion under deferential Fourth Amendment rules—can defeat 
fiercely-protected First Amendment rights.22 The majority approach to the 
 
11.  David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 557–58 (1997); Katherine Grace Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory 
Arrests and the Pretext of Probable Cause, 51 GA. L. REV. 607, 614 (2017). 
12.  Howard, supra note 10, at 614.  
13.  David Weisburd & Rosann Greenspan, Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority: Findings from a 
National Study, NAT’L INST. OF ›JUSTICE 11 (May 2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/18131 
2.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14.  Howard, supra note 10, at 611. 
15.  See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 661 (2012) (dismissing charges against plaintiff based 
on a complete lack of evidence).  
16.  See Randolph A. Robinson, Policing the Police: Protecting Civil Remedies in Cases of Retaliatory 
Arrest, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 499–501 (2012) (explaining that Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are 
mechanisms for imposing civil liability on a state actor who violates an individual’s constitutional rights).  
17.  See, e.g., Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2017); Abeyta v. City of New York, 588 
Fed. App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2014); Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016); McCabe v. Parker, 
608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2010)(imposing a no-probable-cause requirement for retaliatory arrest claims). 
18.  Reichle, 566 U.S. at 670–72 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (warning that only entirely “baseless arrests” 
will give rise to civil liability if retaliatory arrest claims are subject to a no-probable-cause requirement). 
19.  Howard, supra note 10, at 616.  
         20.    Id. 
         21.    Id. 
         22.    See infra Part V.   
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retaliatory arrest analysis ignores the First Amendment rights at stake, and 
instead, starts and ends with probable cause.23 
Therefore, in the majority of jurisdictions, officers have total discretion to 
enforce laws that silence speech, regardless of how minor the infraction or how 
important the message.24 The practical advantage of this police-friendly rule is to 
prevent tragedies like Charlottesville from occurring by allowing police to make 
on-the-spot decisions based on probable cause without fear of civil liability.25 
This Comment argues the current landscape for police civil liability does not 
properly balance protecting First Amendment rights and deferential Fourth 
Amendment rules.26 
Ideally, courts should review claims of pretext on a case-by-case basis to root 
out officers’ actual motivations for making arrests.27 Courts have thus far resisted 
doing so, likely because “the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt.”28 
Instead, courts have accepted that people often act based on multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, motivations.29 This is especially true with police officers making 
decisions under pressure,30 where “realistically, a judge, forced to divine a police 
officer’s motivations, is likely to give the officer the benefit of the doubt.”31 
Still, courts should check police power to restrain speech with a level of 
scrutiny that considers First Amendment concerns rather than let Fourth 
Amendment principles overpower.32 Courts should not bar retaliatory arrest 
claims due to the mere existence of probable cause; courts should scrutinize those 
claims on a case-by-case basis even if the “hunt” is challenging.33 
Retaliatory arrests present an impasse between constitutional doctrines that 
calls for a compromise.34 Part II of this Comment discusses how the retaliatory 
arrest calculus differs from that of ordinary retaliation claims.35 Part III explains 
how Fourth Amendment principles currently dominate the retaliatory arrest 
analysis.36 Part IV examines why First Amendment scrutiny is absent from 
retaliatory arrest claims, despite those claims being rooted in the First 
 
         23.  Howard, supra note 10, at 634. 
24.  Robinson, supra note 16, at 505 (discussing the existing circuit split). 
25.  Kaste, supra note 8 (explaining that police officers struggle to strike the right balance when arresting 
protestors).  
26.  See infra Part V.  
27.  JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 38 (6th ed.). 
28.  Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U L. REV. 785, 786 (1970)).  
29.  Id.  
30.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).  
31.  DRESSLER & MICHAELS,  supra note 27, at 38. 
32.  Howard, supra note 10, at 634, 636.  
33.  Id. at 636.  
34.  Id. at 638–39.  
35.  See infra Part II. 
36.  See infra Part III. 
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Amendment.37 Part V argues that no existing test adequately protects both 
constitutional interests.38 Part VI suggests a totality-of-the-circumstances 
compromise for retaliatory arrests that weighs the silenced speech against the 
probable cause that led to the arrest on a case-by-case basis.39 
II. THE RETALIATORY FRAMEWORK 
In an ordinary retaliation claim, courts use the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting 
test to root out the real motives for government action.40 A prima facie case 
requires a plaintiff to prove the following elements: (1) the speech was 
constitutionally protected; (2) the defendant caused an injury that would chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that constitutionally protected 
speech; and (3) plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected speech 
substantially motivated the defendant’s actions.41 Upon the plaintiff’s satisfactory 
showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant who must rebut by proving “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . . 
even in the absence of the protected conduct.”42 
Part A of this section explains how the Supreme Court veered from the Mt. 
Healthy test in retaliatory prosecutions by adding a no-probable-cause 
requirement.43 Then, Part B posits whether the no-probable-cause-requirement 
extends to retaliatory arrests based on subsequent Supreme Court precedent and 
lower court interpretations.44 
A. The No-Probable-Cause Requirement in Retaliatory Prosecutions 
In Hartman v. Moore, the Supreme Court shifted away from the Mt. Healthy 
test by injecting probable cause as an element of  retaliatory prosecution45 A 
retaliatory prosecution occurs when a prosecutor allegedly brings charges to 
retaliate against an individual’s speech.46 In Hartman, for example, Moore 
lobbied members of Congress to force the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) 
to adopt multiline scanners, a product built by Moore’s company.47 USPS 
 
37.  See infra Part IV. 
38.  See infra Part V. 
39.  See infra Part VIV. 
40.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
41.  Id.  
42. Id.  
43.  See infra Part II.A. 
44.  See infra Part II.B.  
45.  547 U.S. 250, 252, 265–66 (2006). 
46.  Id. at 252. 
47.  Id. at 252–53. 
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opposed Moore’s efforts because it preferred using single-line scanners.48 
After Moore prevailed in his lobbying efforts, the USPS launched an 
investigation into the company, and an Assistant United States Attorney brought 
criminal charges against Moore for alleged kickbacks.49 However, the district 
court eventually acquitted Moore based on a “complete lack of direct evidence” 
of any wrongdoing.50 Moore brought a Bivens action, stating the prosecutor 
violated his First Amendment rights by bringing charges as retaliation for 
lobbying against the USPS.51 
The Supreme Court rejected Moore’s retaliation claim because probable 
cause supported the prosecution.52 The Court was particularly wary of the 
causation problem in the prosecution context.53 Prosecutors enjoy absolute 
immunity for charging decisions, and there is also a strong presumption of 
prosecutorial regularity that shields their actions from judicial inspection.54 As a 
consequence, a plaintiff cannot sue the prosecutor in a retaliatory prosecution 
claim; instead, the defendant must be a third person with a retaliatory motive who 
allegedly induced the prosecutor to bring charges.55 
The causation problem, then, is that a plaintiff must prove that someone other 
than the prosecutor caused the retaliatory prosecution.56 This causal gap between 
the two actors—one with the intent and one who took action—is especially 
challenging in the presence of probable cause.57 Probable cause gives a 
prosecutor legitimate grounds to bring charges, independent of third-party 
motives.58 Essentially, the Hartman Court’s solution amounted to a heightened 
pleading standard: a plaintiff must plead and prove a lack of probable cause at the 
outset because probable cause irreparably muddies the waters of causation59 
Importantly, the Hartman Court understood that probable cause is not 
dispositive.60 The Court knew a no-probable-cause requirement would leave 
some retaliatory prosecutions unchecked, but apparently the Court was willing to 
accept that fact.61 It stated that while it would prefer direct evidence of retaliatory 
intent or inducement, such evidence would be “rare and consequently poor 
 
48.  Id. at 252. 
49.  Id. at 253. 
50.  Id. at 254. 
51.  Id.  
52.  Id. at 265–66.  
53.  Id. at 261. 
54.  Id. at 261–63. 
55.  Id. at 262. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. at 263. 
59.  Id. at 265–66. 
60.  Id. at 265. 
61.  Id.  
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guides in structuring a cause of action.”62 Thus, in the face of complexity, the 
Court chose simplicity.63 
B. Does the No-Probable-Cause Requirement Extend to Retaliatory Arrests? 
Both before and after Hartman, lower courts split on whether the no-
probable-cause requirement applied to retaliatory arrests.64 The majority 
approach currently bars retaliatory arrest claims if probable cause existed for the 
underlying arrest.65 The bright-line Fourth Amendment rule that probable cause 
is a presumptively constitutional reason for an arrest seems to underlie this 
approach.66 In contrast, only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits currently allow claims 
to proceed despite the existence of probable cause.67 Those courts hold that 
Hartman’s rationale is unique to prosecutions and does not apply to arrests, 
primarily due to the lack of a causal gap between two actors.68 
In 2012, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the circuit split in 
Reichle v. Howards.69 In Reichle, Secret Service agents overheard the plaintiff 
making hostile comments about Vice President Richard Cheney’s policies during 
a public appearance at a mall.70 The agents then witnessed the plaintiff confront 
the Vice President and touch his shoulder as he walked away.71 The agents 
arrested the plaintiff for harassment, though the prosecutor dismissed the 
charges.72 
Later, the plaintiff alleged that the agents arrested him as a pretext to silence 
his speech in violation of the First Amendment.73 The matter eventually reached 
the Supreme Court.74 When the matter eventually reached the Supreme Court,  
rather than answer the question on certiorari, the Court instead resolved the case 
 
62.  Id. at 264; The same can be said for arrests. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 27, at 38(“Even 
the most truthful officer may be unable to testify with certainty . . . and a dishonest officer has a strong incentive 
to perjure himself.”). 
63.  Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264–66. 
64.  See John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 755, 773, 775 (2009) (explaining the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits adopted the no-probable-cause requirement; the Ninth and Tenth Circuits rejected it; and the other 
courts have not touched on the question).  
65.  Id. at 775.  
66. Id. at 774; Howard, supra note 10, at 614–15.  
67.  Koerner, supra note 64, at 775.  
68.  See Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 2006) (allowing retaliatory arrest 
claims to proceed despite the existence of probable cause).  
69.  Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663 (analyzing whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim may lie 
despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest).  
70.  Id. at 660.  
71.  Id. at 660–61.  
72.  Id. at 661.  
73.  Id. at 662. 
74.  Id. at 663. 
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by granting the officers qualified immunity due to its reluctance to unnecessarily 
decide constitutional issues.75 The Court held that due to the circuit split and 
Hartman decision, the law on retaliatory arrests was not clearly established 
enough to impose liability on the agents.76 
Within its determination, the Court mentioned similarities between arrests 
and prosecutions that may be relevant for deciding the constitutional issue in a 
future case.77 First, the Court noted it “has never recognized a right to be free 
from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.”78 Indeed, the 
majority of lower courts post-Reichle have cited this language as the Supreme 
Court’s approval of extending Hartman’s rule to arrests because there is no 
protected right at stake.79 
Second, the Court stated that arrests, like prosecutions, also present a 
“tenuous causal connection.”80 The Court admitted that the causal gap is not 
identical because an arresting officer, unlike a prosecutor, is not entirely immune 
from liability.81 Therefore, the plaintiff can sue the officer directly, appearing to 
leave a simplified causal chain because the arresting officer will often be the 
person both harboring the retaliatory intent and initiating the arrest.82 
As the Reichle Court hinted, arrests are not always simple; multiple actors 
may be involved in an arrest, and outside parties can induce an officer to make an 
arrest.83 For example, in 2014 a man parodied the mayor of Peoria, Illinois on 
Twitter, insinuating that the mayor was involved in unethical, immoral, and 
criminal behavior.84 Eventually, police raided the man’s apartment and arrested 
him for “impersonating a public official.”85 The man sued the City of Peoria 
claiming police arrested him due to outside pressure from the mayor or his 
supporters to shut down his Twitter page.86 The parties settled out of court, but it 
shows how third parties can feasibly induce officers to arrest disliked speakers  
the same way third parties might induce a prosecutor to bring charges.87 
 
75.  Id. at 663–64. 
76.  Id. at 670. 
77.  Id. at 667. 
78.  Id. at 664–65. 
79.  See, e.g., Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Reichle to justify applying a 
no-probable-cause rule to arrests). 
80.  Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668.  
81.  Id. at 668–69. 
82.  Id.  
83.  See generally Dawn Rhodes, Police Raid Over Fake Twitter Account Costs Peoria $125,000, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-twitter-peoria-mayor-lawsuit-
20150902-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing a situation where 
multiple actors, who were not law enforcement officers, contributed to an arrest). 
84. Id.  
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
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The Reichle Court itself pointed out at least one other way an arrest can have 
complex causation: when an officer arrests someone based on a “wholly 
legitimate consideration of speech.”88 According to the Court, speech can 
properly trigger an arrest when it supplies probable cause or evidence of a 
threat.89 
The Reichle Court cited Wayte v. United States as an example.90 In Wayte, a 
young man failed to register with the Selective Service as the law mandated.91 
The man also wrote letters to the government expressing his intent not to 
register.92 Upon his indictment, the Court used the man’s own speech against 
him: “The letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps 
conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply—one of the 
elements of the offense.”93 Technically, police arrested the man  partly because 
of his protected speech, yet the Reichle Court implied the Wayte arrest did not 
rise to the level of retaliation.94 
The Reichle Court’s suggestion that even arrests can have complex causation 
echoes the Hartman Court’s underlying causation concern: “Some degree of bad 
motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been 
taken anyway.”95 In other words, probable cause complicates causation .96  Just as 
probable cause is an independently legitimate reason for a prosecutor to bring 
charges, probable cause is also a legitimate reason for an officer to make an 
arrest.97 Therefore, under deferential Fourth Amendment principles, probable 
cause outweighs any alleged retaliatory motive that concurrently may have 
contributed to the arrest.98 
Under the current framework, retaliatory prosecution claims have a no-
probable-cause requirement after Hartman.99 It is not clear whether the no-
probable-cause requirement extends to retaliatory arrests because the Supreme 
Court left the question open in Reichle, but most lower courts extend the 
Hartman rule to retaliatory arrests in the absence of further guidance by the 
 
88.  Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. (citing Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 612–13 (1985)).  
91.  Wayte, 470 U.S. at 601.  
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at 612–13. 
94.  Howards, 566 U.S. at 668 (considering speech is proper when it goes to an element of a crime).  
95.  Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added). 
96.  See id. at 263 (explaining “the distinct problem of causation” in retaliatory prosecution claims is 
showing that a prosecutor with legitimate grounds to bring charges did not do so for legitimate reasons).  
97.  See id. (explaining “the distinct problem of causation” in retaliatory prosecution claims is showing 
that a prosecutor with legitimate grounds to bring charges did not do so for legitimate reasons).  
98.  Howard, supra note 10, 616, 636.  
99.  See supra Part II.A (discussing Hartman’s holding that a no-probable-cause requirement applies to 
retaliatory prosecution claims). 
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Supreme Court.100 
III. THE OVERPOWERING INFLUENCE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS 
A retaliatory arrest may implicate First Amendment rights, but the Fourth 
Amendment ultimately governs arrests.101 The Supreme Court prefers bright-line 
Fourth Amendment rules because case-by-case determinations risk turning 
“every discretionary judgment in the field . . . into an occasion for constitutional 
review.”102 
Part A explores how courts that impose a no-probable-cause requirement to 
retaliatory arrest claims rely on Fourth Amendment precedent rather than First 
Amendment concerns.103 And those courts typically use a matter-of-fact approach 
for doing so with little explanation.104 Further, Part B then reveals how most 
courts, including the Supreme Court, opt to grant officers qualified immunity 
instead of deciding retaliatory arrest claims on the merits, which caters to 
overarching Fourth Amendment principles of granting deference to law 
enforcement whenever possible.105 
A. Fourth Amendment Concerns Dominate the Retaliatory Arrest Analysis 
The strength of deferential Fourth Amendment rules is evident, and the 
Supreme Court seems to have accepted that those rules may, at times, adversely 
affect individual freedoms.106 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, police officers 
arrested a plaintiff for a seatbelt violation.107 The plaintiff argued that an arrest 
for such a minor infraction was unreasonable and violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights.108 Further, she asked the Court to establish a new test that 
 
100.  The Supreme Court recently left the question open yet again. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 
S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (2018) (“[W]hether in a retaliatory arrest case the Hartman approach should apply . . . [or] the 
inquiry should be governed only by Mt. Healthy is a determination that must await a different case.”). In 
Lozman, the plaintiff alleged that the City ordered his arrest for criticizing public officials during an open city 
council meeting pursuant to an official retaliatory policy. Id. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s claim was “far 
afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim” and abolished the Hartman rule in favor of the Mt. Healthy test 
only in the narrow circumstances presented. Id. For the “mine run of arrests,” however, the no-probable-cause 
debate is still unresolved. Id.  
101.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).  
102.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).   
103.  Infra Part III.A. 
104.  See infra Part III.A. 
105.  See infra Part III.B.  
106.  Arnold H. Loewy, Cops Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 
560 (2002) (“[T]he Arrest of Ms. Atwater, though considered individually unreasonable, was held to be 
constitutionally reasonable.”).  
107.  Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324. 
108.  Id. at 325.  
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would forbid “custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when conviction could 
not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling 
need for immediate detention.”109 
The Court rejected her argument and held that an officer can properly arrest 
when he has probable cause that even a minor crime has been committed in his 
presence.110 The Court’s rationale was that forcing officers to balance public 
against private interests on a case-by-case basis would be unworkable and create 
a “systematic disincentive to arrest.”111 The Court decided that, for Fourth 
Amendment cases, “[m]ultiplied many times over, the costs to society of such 
underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being 
needlessly arrested and booked.”112 Thus, the Court has shown that it is willing to 
sacrifice individual rights to give way to bright-line rules that guide officers’ 
actions.113 The theme of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is often administrative 
efficiency.114 
This concept also appeared in Whren v. United States.115 In Whren, a police 
officer pulled over a group of African American men for multiple traffic 
violations.116 The men argued that the stop was a pretext for racial discrimination, 
and they advocated for a “reasonable officer” standard.117 Under the defendants’ 
proposed standard, the test for arrests would be “whether a police officer, acting 
reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given,” not whether 
probable cause existed.118 
The Supreme Court was not sympathetic.119 It criticized the reasonable 
officer standard as a subjective test disguised as an objective test because it 
would ultimately turn on whether the police officer’s state of mind drove him to 
deviate from usual police practices.120 The Court also remarked that such a test, 
which aimed to “plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement,” would 
worsen evidentiary difficulties associated with proving intent.121 Finally, the 
 
109.  Id. at 346. 
110.  Id. at 354. 
111.  Id. at 351 (“But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is 
not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determination of government need, lest every 
discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.”).  
112.  Id.  
113.  Id.  
114.  Id. at 350 (“[The Plaintiff’s] rule therefore would not only place police in an almost impossible spot 
but would guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur.”).  
115.  517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
116.  Id. at 808. 
117.  Id. at 809. 
118.  Id. at 810. 
119.  Id. at 819 (holding the traffic stop was reasonable and affirming the convictions).  
120.  Id. at 814. 
121.  Id. at 814–15 (“While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide objective 
assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical 
constable—an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity.”).  
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Court also noted that police practices vary depending on the locale, and the 
Fourth Amendment should not apply differently between jurisdictions.122 For all 
these reasons, the Whren Court held that, so long as there was probable cause for 
the stop, the arrest was lawful regardless of the officer’s alleged bad motive.123 
The defendants argued that cunning officers could inevitably conjure up 
probable cause for anyone because of the panoply of available laws.124 The Court 
acknowledged this concern, but stated it was ill-suited to decide the merits of 
enforcing some laws over others.125 Further the Court may simply not be overly 
concerned about pretextual stops because the issue is not litigated very often.126 
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to burden officers with an added 
mental balancing test when probable cause to arrest clearly exists.127 In Virginia 
v. Moore, officers arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license, a 
misdemeanor violation that required a citation rather than an arrest under 
Virginia law.128 Although the officer violated state law by making the arrest, the 
state law did not allow for suppression of evidence.129 Instead, the defendant 
attempted to suppress evidence based on Fourth Amendment principles.130 He 
argued that because state law prevented officers from arresting for minor crimes, 
his arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.131 
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding the state law was at 
odds with Fourth Amendment principles giving officers discretion to arrest for 
any crime, felony or misdemeanor alike.132 In so holding, the Court reemphasized 
“the need for a bright-line constitutional standard” based on its concern about 
officers facing difficult judgment calls during arrests.133 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s steady preference for bright-line Fourth 
Amendment rules is illustrated by its distaste for more complicated tests.134 It 
rejected Atwater’s attempt to draw lines between misdemeanors and felonies.135 
 
122.  Id. at 815. 
123.  Id. at 819 (“For the run-of-the-mine case . . . there is no realistic alternative to the traditional 
common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”).  
124.  Id. at 818. 
125.  Id. at 818–19. 
126.  See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (stating the country is not facing an epidemic of minor offense 
arrests); see also Hartman, 547 U.S. at 258–59 (rejecting the argument that there will be a flood of litigation in 
retaliatory prosecution claims).  
127.  See generally Va. v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (concluding that the burden on officers must not 
be too high because of the challenges officers face in the field). 
128.  Id. at 166–67. 
129.  Id. at 167. 
130.  Id. at 168. 
131.  Id.  
132.  Id. at 178. 
133.  Id. at 175. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id.  
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It rejected Whren’s reasonable officer standard.136 And it rejected Moore’s state 
law-based balancing test.137 In the retaliatory arrest context, allowing claims to 
proceed despite probable cause would arguably force officers to use a balancing 
test for arrests whenever speech is involved.138 In that sense, the widespread 
acceptance of the no-probable-cause requirement is understandable because it 
appears most loyal to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent.139 
B. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine Bolsters Fourth Amendment Dominance 
Qualified immunity is yet another protection for law enforcement officers.140 
It attaches when an official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”141 
In White v. Pauly, the Court reinforced the qualified immunity doctrine.142 In 
White, Officer White arrived late at the scene where police were ordering a 
suspect to exit his home.143 Officer White heard the suspect yell, “We have 
guns,” and then the suspect shot at officers and pointed a handgun in the 
direction of Officer White, who was protected by a large stone.144 Officer White 
emerged from behind the stone, then shot and killed the suspect.145 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether Officer White was 
entitled to qualified immunity because he used deadly force without first warning 
the victim.146 The Court reversed the lower court and granted Officer White 
qualified immunity, holding that, to be clearly established, the law at issue must 
be “particularized” to the factual scenario.147 This means officers will escape 
liability using the qualified immunity defense unless the court already ruled on an 
almost identical factual scenario in the past.148 Thus, even though failure to warn 
 
136.  Id. at 172. 
137.  Id. at 176.  
138.  See infra Part VI.  
139.  Redd v. City of Enterprise, 14014 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When a police officer has 
probable cause to believe that a person is committing a particular public offense, he is justified in arresting that 
person, even if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested.”). 
140.  See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Howards, 566 U.S. at 664 (analyzing the 
qualified immunity doctrine). 
141.  Id. at 308. (“While this Court’s case law ‘do[es] not require a case directly on point’ for a right to be 
clearly established, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.’ In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.’”).  
142.  137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).  
143.  Id. at 550. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id.  
146.  Id.  
147.  Id. at 552. 
148.  Id. (stating plaintiff failed to identity a case where an officer faced similar circumstances and was 
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before using deadly force constitutes a “run-of-the mill Fourth Amendment 
violation,” Officer White was still entitled to qualified immunity because no 
previous case was factually similar enough to White’s to clearly establish the law 
for that specific scenario.149 The extreme particularity required to overcome 
qualified immunity shows how the Supreme Court continues to diligently shield 
officers from liability whenever possible.150 
Reichle is an example of how qualified immunity trumps retaliatory arrest 
claims.151 In Reichle, the Court granted Secret Service agents qualified immunity 
because the law about retaliatory arrests was not clearly established due to circuit 
splits and the confusion caused by the Hartman decision.152 The Reichle Court’s 
refusal to resolve the split or to clearly establish whether the no-probable-cause 
requirement applies to retaliatory arrests ensures the qualified immunity defense 
is still available in retaliatory arrest cases.153 
Even in minority circuits that reject the no-probable-cause requirement, the 
trend towards qualified immunity reigns.154 For example, in Skoog v. County of 
Clamakas, the plaintiff had a reputation in his community for videotaping and 
photographing police officers in the field, and he also was engaged in lawsuits 
against the county and police officers challenging his previous DUI arrest.155 
Officers eventually obtained a search warrant based on probable cause for 
filming officers without consent, and eleven officers raided the plaintiff’s house, 
some with guns drawn.156 The plaintiff alleged during the raid, an officer 
explicitly stated, “People shouldn’t sue cops.”157 
The plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing the officers 
acted in retaliation for the plaintiff’ exercising his constitutionally protected 
speech.158 The Ninth Circuit rejected the no-probable-cause requirement, which 
would presumably allow the plaintiff’s claim to proceed, yet the court ultimately 
granted the officers qualified immunity despite the officers’ highly questionable 
conduct.159 
 
held to have violated the Fourth Amendment).  
149.  Id.  
150.  Id. at 551–52 (“In the last five years, this Court has issued a number of opinions reversing federal 
courts in qualified immunity cases. The Court has found this necessary both because qualified immunity is 
important to ‘society as a whole,’ and because as ‘an immunity from suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is effectively 
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
151.  Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663. 
152.  Id. at 670. 
153.  Id. at 664. 
154.  See generally Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that qualified 
immunity shielded officers from liability in a retaliatory arrest case). 
155.  Id. at 1225. 
156.  Id. at 1226–27. 
157.  Id. at 1227. 
158.  Id.  
159.  Id. at 1235. 
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The judicial tendency to shield law enforcement officers through qualified 
immunity echoes the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has given officers 
significant discretion.160 Advocating for allowing retaliatory arrest claims despite 
the existence of probable cause is an uphill battle because the position defies the 
pervasive trend of shielding police officers from liability.161 Yet allowing Fourth 
Amendment principles to overpower the analysis ignores the fact that retaliatory 
arrests are ultimately First Amendment claims.162 
IV. THE NONEXISTENT ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN RETALIATORY 
ARREST CLAIMS 
None of the First Amendment retaliation tests use the type of scrutiny that 
has developed in First Amendment jurisprudence.163 Part A suggests that this 
may be because retaliatory arrests blend speech and unlawful conduct or because 
retaliation claims are distinct from substantive constitutional claims.164 But even 
if a normal First Amendment test applied, Part B explains that strict First 
Amendment scrutiny may be insufficient to protect speech in a retaliatory arrest 
claim.165 
A. Why Retaliation Claims are Treated Differently Than Non-Retaliation First 
Amendment Claims 
Courts do not treat First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims like other types 
of First Amendment claims.166 One explanation may be the inherent difficulty of 
separating unlawful conduct from lawful expression.167 The Supreme Court 
discussed this problem in United States v. O’Brien.168 There, the defendant 
burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War.169 Despite his First Amendment 
right to protest, the Court held the defendant’s act of burning the draft card was 
illegal.170 
The Court, concerned about individuals using the First Amendment to shield 
otherwise unlawful action, held that unlawful conduct could be restricted, even if 
 
160.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the discretion officers enjoy under Fourth Amendment precedent). 
161.  See e.g., Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1235 (finding that qualified immunity shielded officers from liability in 
a retaliatory arrest case). 
162.  Howard, supra note 10, at 636.  
163.  Id.  
164.  See infra Part IV.A.   
165.  See infra Part IV.B. 
166.  Howard, supra note 10, at 636.  
167.  See generally U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (analyzing the distinction between protected 
speech and unprotected conduct). 
168.  Id.  
169.  Id. at 369.  
170.  Id.  
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that meant incidental limitations on the freedom of expression.171 Extending 
O’Brien’s reasoning suggests that retaliatory arrests might be treated differently 
than other speech restrictions because some objectively unlawful conduct is 
involved in a retaliatory arrest.172 
Another possible reason courts do not use traditional First Amendment 
analysis for retaliatory arrest claims may be due to the distinction between 
constitutional tort claims and “direct” constitutional claims.173 It seems the 
crucial difference is timing.174 In a First Amendment context, a direct 
constitutional violation prevents speech from happening, while a tortious 
retaliatory government action punishes past speech.175 As the Supreme Court 
explained, “In the standard retaliation case recognized in our precedent, the 
plaintiff has performed some discrete act in the past . . . [t]he plaintiff’s action is 
over and done with, and the only question is the defendant’s purpose. . . .”176 
But a retaliatory arrest is more like a direct constitutional violation because 
the plaintiff’s speech is not necessarily “over and done with” at the time of the 
arrest.177 In Hartman, the prosecutor brought charges long after the plaintiff 
completed his lobbying efforts.178 An officer, in contrast, could arrest a 
demonstrator mid-protest.179 
For example, after Donald Trump was elected President, the Los Angeles 
Police Department (“LAPD”) arrested 462 protestors, mostly for blocking 
roadways or failing to disperse.180 A year later, records showed the LAPD only 
 
171.  Id. at 376–77. 
When “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms; a government regulation is sufficiently 
justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.  
Id. 
172.  Howard, supra note 10, at 614 (explaining bright line rules preserve the ability of law enforcement 
to regulate unlawful conduct safely).  
173.  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 148 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010). 
174.  Id.  
175.  Id. (“A retaliation claim is different. It asks not whether the exercise of a right has been 
unconstitutionally burdened or inhibited (in other words, survives rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict 
scrutiny review), but whether the Government is punishing the plaintiffs for exercising their rights.”) In that 
sense, a retaliation claim does not “burden” or “inhibit” speech because the speaker was already able to get his 
message out.  
176.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 558 n.10 (2007).  
177.  Id.  
178.  Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253.  
179.  James Queally, The LAPD arrested 462 people in anti-Trump protests. Only three were criminally 
charged, Times analysis finds, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-lapd-protest-charges-20171102-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
180.  Id.  
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sought charges in ten of the 462 cases, and prosecutors only filed charges in three 
of those ten cases.181 Further, the Los Angeles City Council approved an 
ordinance that places more restrictions on the items protestors may carry, 
including limits on the types of signs allowed during protests.182 This kind of 
ordinance could provide officers even more opportunities to silence 
demonstrators on-the-spot, so it may not be appropriate to deal with retaliatory 
arrests like other retaliation claims.183 
B. Though Retaliatory Arrests Claims are First Amendment Claims, Strict 
Scrutiny May Not Be the Appropriate Test 
Content- and viewpoint-based speech restrictions are typically subjected to 
strict judicial scrutiny because the First Amendment represents “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”184 To pass strict scrutiny, the government 
must prove that a regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest;185 analysts have referred to the test as “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” as 
regulations rarely survive.186 
A retaliatory arrest functions as a direct, immediate content- or viewpoint-
based restriction of speech, yet courts do not test retaliatory arrests with strict 
scrutiny.187 This presents a startling discrepancy: judges inspect content-based 
speech restrictions under a microscope but shut their eyes to retaliatory arrest 
claims so long as there is probable cause for the arrest.188 
Although the Fourth Amendment currently overpowers the First Amendment 
in retaliatory arrest claims, a First Amendment takeover is not necessarily the 
solution.189 As Justice Blackmun noted: 
The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution 
. . . Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot 
subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment 
at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment 
 
181.  Id.  
182.  Id.  
183.  Id.  
184.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
185.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target 
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).  
186.  See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that the 
strict scrutiny test is “strict in theory, fatal in fact” because speech restrictions rarely survive strict scrutiny). 
187.  Howard, supra note 10, at 635.  
188.  Id. at 636.  
189.  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 761 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court.190 
Beyond the need to balance other constitutional concerns, like the Fourth 
Amendment,191 applying strict scrutiny to retaliatory arrest claims may be 
futile.192 A retaliatory arrest may slip through strict scrutiny because law 
enforcement is a compelling interest, and arrests are a  judicially-approved way 
of achieving that interest, whether or not speech is involved.193 Just as the 
Hartman Court hinted, courts face difficulty separating legitimate law 
enforcement interests from illegitimate retaliatory motives, and strict scrutiny 
does not make the task any easier.194 
V. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF TWO CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES AND LACK OF 
ALTERNATIVES 
Probable cause permeates Fourth Amendment law.195 In the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, “the rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found [for] safeguard[ing] citizens 
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded 
charges of crime [while giving] fair leeway for enforcing the law in the 
community’s protection.”196 
Despite its critical role in Fourth Amendment law, probable cause is an 
incompatible threshold requirement for retaliatory arrest claims for several 
reasons.197 First, a no-probable-cause requirement creates an objective threshold 
to an inherently subjective cause of action.198 Retaliatory arrest claims hinge on 
whether the arresting officer subjectively harbored a retaliatory intent, making it 
absurd to bar a subjective claim based on an objective standard.199 
Also, in contrast to strict First Amendment scrutiny, probable cause is a low 
standard.200 Loosely defined as “fair probability of a crime,” the Supreme Court 
has held that the belief that there is probable cause need not be more true than 
false.201 Thus, in a retaliatory arrest case, First Amendment rights, normally 
 
190.  Id.  
191.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the discretion officers enjoy under Fourth Amendment precedent). 
192.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (describing the contours of the strict scrutiny test).  
193.  See supra Part IV.A (discussing how strict scrutiny is unworkable for retaliatory arrest claims). 
194.  Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263 (describing the “factual difficulty of divining” the true source of a 
person’s motivations).  
195.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 
243 (1984) (noting that probable cause “lies at the heart” of the Fourth Amendment).  
196.  Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).  
197.  Robinson, supra note 16, at 511, 514–15.  
198.  Id.  
199.  Id.  
200.  Id. at 514.  
201.  See, e.g., Ill. v. Gates, 642 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Tx. v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (defining 
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protected by the strictest judicial scrutiny, can be overcome by something less 
than fifty percent accuracy.202 
Finally, probable cause is malleable.203 If the original source of probable 
cause turns out to be insufficient, an officer can point to some other source of 
probable cause that may or may not have been in his mind at the time of arrest.204 
In Devenpeck v. Alford, the defendant challenged a finding of probable cause 
after an officer arrested him for violating the Washington Privacy Act;205 the 
violation did not amount to a criminal offense.206 But regardless, the Supreme 
Court held that the arrest would be reasonable so long as the officer could point 
to some source of probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest, such as 
impersonating an officer or obstructing law enforcement, even if the officer did 
not cite those other sources as the reason for the arrest.207 Probable cause’s 
malleability cuts against the First Amendment concept that speech restrictions 
must be narrowly-tailored.208 
Allen v. Cisneros, a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
illustrates the unfairness of imposing probable cause as a threshold requirement 
to retaliatory arrest claims and asking the plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of 
pleading and proving a lack of probable cause.209 In Allen, a street preacher 
brought a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against officers who arrested 
him while he was preaching in the street.210 The plaintiff alleged that officers 
arrested him because he attempted to film the officers’ treatment of him.211 The 
officers argued that the plaintiff was arrested for violating a city ordinance 
prohibiting demonstrators from carrying objects more than three-quarters of an 
inch thick.212 The preacher carried a shofar, which is a “trumpet-like instrument 
made from a ram’s horn . . . used in Judaism to mark the holidays of Rosh 
Hashanah and Yom Kippur.”213 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment in 
the officers’ favor because the shofar provided probable cause for the violation of 
the city ordinance.214 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit completely blocked the claim 
 
the probable cause standard). 
202.  Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
203.  See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (rejecting a test that would require probable 
cause to be closely related to the offense that motivated the officer at the time of arrest). 
204.  Id.  
205.   Id. at 150.  
206.  Id. at 152.  
207.  Id. at 153, 156.  
208.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.  
209.  815 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2016). 
210.  Id. at 241–42. 
211.  Id. at 242. 
212.  Id. at 245. 
213.  Id. at 242 n.1. 
214.  Id. at 246–47. 
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based on a highly technical city ordinance, despite the existence of plausible 
evidence pointing to retaliatory motives by the police.215 Allen exemplifies the 
majority approach—in a collision between the First and Fourth Amendments, the 
Fourth Amendment prevails.216 
The Supreme Court’s bright-line Fourth Amendment rules may seem harsh, 
but Justice Scalia extended an olive branch in Whren.217 He suggested that 
although probable cause forecloses a Fourth Amendment claim, an individual 
could bring a suit under a different constitutional amendment.218 In Whren, for 
example, the defendants could have brought viable Equal Protection claims 
because they claimed that police arrested them as a pretext for racial 
discrimination.219 Justice Scalia’s words in Whren are meaningless if courts 
foreclose all recourse for a First Amendment violation whenever any probable 
cause supports an arrest, but the trouble is finding a method to litigate retaliatory 
arrest claims in a way that preserves both the First and Fourth Amendment.220 
The Court has not opined on Justice Scalia’s olive branch since Whren, and 
lower courts have applied the concept inconsistently.221 Oddly, probable cause 
does not defeat Equal Protection-based challenges in the very same courts of 
appeal that allow probable cause to bar First Amendment claims.222 For instance, 
the Eighth Circuit held that an Equal Protection claim “does not require proof 
[that the plaintiff] was stopped without probable cause.”223 Yet that same circuit 
imposed the opposite rule for retaliatory arrest claims.224 It is unclear why courts 
treat First and Fourteenth Amendment claims differently, especially because the 
Supreme Court has adopted similar tests for both.225 
The Supreme Court stated that Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 
substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights 
 
215.  Id.  
216.  Id. at 247 n.8 (finding probable cause trumps a First Amendment claim). 
217.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
218.  Id.  
219.  Id.  
220.  Id.  
221.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing a section 1983 
claim based on the Equal Protection clause to proceed regardless of the existence of probable cause). 
222.  Id.  
223. Id. (“When the claim is selective enforcement of the traffic laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the 
plaintiff must normally prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or arrested in order to show 
the requisite discriminatory effect and purpose.”). 
224.  See McCabe, 608 F.3d at 1075 (“Lack of probable cause is a necessary element of all the claims 
McCabe and Nelson brought arising from the allegedly unlawful arrests.”). 
225.  See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (“Proof 
that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not 
necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to 
the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible 
purpose not been considered”) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). 
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elsewhere conferred.”226 Extending that reasoning, Section 1983 analysis should 
match the framework that governs the constitutional right allegedly infringed.227 
For example, in an excessive force claim brought under Section 1983, a court 
would analyze the claim using the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as a 
guidepost.228 
Therefore, because a retaliatory arrest infringes on First Amendment rights, 
courts should judge the claims by First Amendment standards, which do not 
include a no-probable-cause threshold requirement.229 Further, First Amendment 
scrutiny places the burden on the government, not the individual.230 But as 
mentioned previously, even strict scrutiny is unworkable because the government 
can always cite a compelling interest in enforcing laws when there is probable 
cause, and the Supreme Court has already granted officers discretion to make 
arrests for even the most minor violations.231 
Even the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting test, used for ordinary retaliation 
claims, does not strike the proper compromise, which may explain why courts 
still default to qualified immunity rather than apply Mt. Healthy to retaliatory 
arrest claims.232 The Mt. Healthy test does not protect First Amendment rights 
sufficiently because the government can rebut by showing “by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the 
absence of the protected conduct.”233 The preponderance of the evidence standard 
is low—it means more likely than not, even if by a minuscule margin.234 This low 
standard provides an escape hatch for officers armed with probable cause.235 
Because probable cause carries such a weighty presumption, it is arguably 
dispositive under Mt. Healthy at the expense of First Amendment rights.236 
On the other hand, even if probable cause is not dispositive under Mt. 
Healthy, allowing a claim to proceed despite probable cause chips away at Fourth 
Amendment principles of officer discretion.237 Mt. Healthy does not account for 
an arrest scenario because it was not a case about criminal procedure; it was a 
 
226.  Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
227.  Id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.  
228.  Id.  
229.  Howard, supra note 10, at 635.  
230.  Howard, supra note 10, at 631.  
231.  See supra Part IV.B (discussing the difficulty of applying strict scrutiny because probable cause 
justifies an arrest). 
232.  See, e.g., Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1235 (finding that even assuming retaliatory motives existed, officer 
was entitled to qualified immunity). 
233.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 287. 
234.  John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 1569, 1573 (2015).  
235.  Howard, supra note 10, at 615.  
236.  Id.  
237.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency protect officer discretion).  
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retaliatory termination case.238 Probable cause is not an impediment to 
employment claims, and thus does not consume the analysis as it does in 
retaliatory arrest claims.239 For this reason, even Mt. Healthy does not strike the 
proper compromise for retaliatory arrest cases.240 
VI. THE COMPROMISE 
The Supreme Court stated, “we know of no principled basis on which to 
create a hierarchy of constitutional values.”241 Retaliatory arrests unavoidably 
implicate both the First and Fourth Amendments, and existing tests do not 
adequately compromise between the two competing doctrines.242 However, a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test allows for fair consideration of all First and 
Fourth Amendment concerns.243 
Technically, police officers are already equipped to consider the totality-of-
the-circumstances in the field, shown by the fact that the probable cause test itself 
is a totality-of-the-circumstances test.244 Beyond that, the Supreme Court also 
considers the totality-of-the circumstances when deciding whether confessions 
are voluntary or warrantless searches are reasonable.245 
Although the Court has rejected balancing tests that burden officers on the 
scene, it has not entirely foreclosed the need for balancing246 In Whren, the 
Supreme Court stated, “[I]n principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it 
turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant 
factors. With rare exceptions . . . the result of that balancing is not in doubt where 
the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.”247 
The Court continued by explaining that those “rare exceptions” which 
actually require a balancing test are searches or seizures “unusually harmful to an 
individual’s privacy or even physical interests.”248 
 
238.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 276. 
239.  Id. at 287 (presenting the Mt. Healthy test, which does not factor in probable cause as it is a 
retaliatory termination case).  
240.  See infra Part VI (setting forth an alternative to the Mt. Healthy standard).  
241.  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 
484 (1982). 
242.  See supra Part V (analyzing the weaknesses inherent in the Hartman and  Mt. Healthy standards). 
243.  Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (“We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard 
will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires 
. . . .”).  
244.  Id. at 230, 238. 
245.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (finding that voluntariness in the context 
of confessions is judged based on the totality of the circumstances); see also Mo. v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 
156 (2013) (“Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case 
by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”). 
246.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 817. 
247.  Id.  
248.  Id. at 818 (“For example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a home, entry 
 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50 
707 
A retaliatory arrest should qualify as one of those “rare exceptions” that is 
“unusually harmful” to individuals because of the First Amendment rights at 
stake and thus should trigger a balancing of all relevant factors.249 In a retaliatory 
arrest context, a totality-of-the-circumstances test would likely include factors 
such as the source of probable cause, the severity of the underlying crime, and 
any exigencies, weighed against the degree and value of expression inhibited or 
affected by the arrest.250 
In a way, a totality-of-the-circumstances test mirrors the Mt. Healthy test 
because both parties bear a distinct burden.251 But rather than allow defendants to 
rebut upon a meager showing that, by a preponderance of the evidence, probable 
cause existed and motivated the arrest, the Court would need to weigh the 
defendant’s evidence of probable cause against plaintiff’s evidence of a 
retaliatory motive, with heightened skepticism when political or other core 
speech has been affected.252 
Part A discusses how a totality-of-the-circumstances test would factor into 
First Amendment concerns253 and Part B shows how the test would restrain, but 
not eliminate, the Fourth Amendment issues at play in a retaliatory arrest.254 
A. First Amendment Concerns Enter the Equation 
The Supreme Court generally has no appetite for assessing the value of 
speech, but has reluctantly considered the value of speech in the past when 
defining the scope of unprotected categories of speech.255 For instance, the Court 
carved out an exception to otherwise unprotected obscenity when the expression 
at issue has “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”256 
Further, under the “speech integral to a crime” category of unprotected 
speech, not all speech is treated equally—often the determination of whether 
advocacy of crime is protected is based on its potential value to noncriminal 
listeners.257 Commercial speech also enjoys less protection in part because of its 
 
into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.” (internal citations omitted).).  
249.  Id.  
250.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (stating the totality of the circumstances test considers all relevant factors). 
251.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 287 (illustrating the burden-shifting aspect 
of the Mt. Healthy test). 
252.  See supra Part IV.B. (discussing strict scrutiny).  
253.  See infra Part VI.A. 
254.  See infra Part VI.B.  
255.  Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 
1002 (May 2016).  
256.  Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating an exception to obscenity when the expression has 
“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
257.  Volokh, supra note 255, at 1002–03.  
We see that in the Court’s libel test. We see it in the obscenity test. And we see it in the decisions 
under the “integral part of unlawful conduct” exception. Whether speech that is connected to 
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“low value.”258 Conversely, the Supreme Court decided that “speech about 
matters of public concern . . . is perched at the top of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values, meriting special protection.”259 
Looking at the value of speech on a spectrum, the arrest of a protestor 
requires more judicial skepticism, and thus a greater showing of legitimate police 
motives, than an arrest based on obscenity or commercial speech because of the 
First Amendment preference for wide-open debate on public issues.260 Despite its 
reluctance to place a value on speech, the Court has shown the capacity to do so 
when necessary and should do so in the context of retaliatory arrests.261 
B. Tempering the Role of Probable Cause and the Fourth Amendment 
Officers enjoy great discretion to make arrests.262 Part of that discretion 
includes choosing not to make an arrest.263 For example, officers may decide not 
to make arrests based on limited numbers of available police, prosecutors, courts, 
and jails.264 Officers may also determine that the circumstances of a specific case 
do not warrant enforcement.265 Indeed, police officers “virtually always have an 
array of options when faced with criminality.”266 
Although the Supreme Court rejected a “reasonable officer standard” in 
Whren, such a test may be necessary in a retaliatory arrest claim because the 
primary goal of the claim is to root out pretext.267 Applying a reasonable officer 
standard to Allen v. Cisneros as an example, the defendant would need to show 
not only that a reasonable officer would have enforced the city ordinance 
prohibiting demonstrators from carrying objects greater than three-quarters of an 
inch thick, but also that the reasonable officer would have arrested the street 
 
unlawful conduct can be punished turns on how valuable the speech is. Much advocacy of crime is 
protected because of its potential value to noncriminal listeners, despite its tendency to cause crime 
by some other listeners. Much offensive speech to the public is protected because of its potential 
value to willing listeners, despite its tendency to cause some offended listeners to criminally attack 
the speaker. And much publication of illegally created, intercepted, or leaked material is protected 
because of its potential value to listeners, despite its tendency to stimulate such illegality in the 
future. 
Id. 
258.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980). 
259.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). 
260.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).   
261.  Volokh, supra note 255, at 1002. 
262.  See supra Part. III.A (delineating how Fourth Amendment precedent developed to give officers 
considerable discretion making arrests). 
263.  NEIL P. COHEN, STANLEY E. ADELMAN & LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE 
POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 28 (4th ed.). 
264.  Id.  
265.  Id.  
266.  Id.  
267.  Howard, supra note 10, at 611.  
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preacher for carrying a shofar in violation of that ordinance.268 
The reasonable officer standard could counterbalance the “value of speech” 
analysis in the totality-of-the-circumstances test.269 Because the street preacher in 
Allen was protesting and lawfully filming police conduct, for instance, a totality-
of-the-circumstances test would require a more compelling showing by the 
officer that his actions were reasonable.270 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court cemented the no-probable-cause requirement 
for retaliatory prosecution claims,271 the Court has not ruled on whether that 
requirement applies to retaliatory arrests.272 Amid the Court’s silence, many 
lower courts follow suit by avoiding the issue,273 but the majority of courts that 
choose to resolve the question have extended the no-probable-cause requirement 
to retaliatory arrests.274 This trend should be reversed because requiring 
plaintiffs—the alleged victims—to plead and prove a lack of probable cause to 
bring a retaliatory arrest claim gives officers the capacity to instantly and 
completely silence a speaker without any judicial oversight.275 
Neither First Amendment analysis, Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
Hartman rule, nor the Mt. Healthy test successfully juggle the constitutional 
concerns at play in a retaliatory arrest.276 A totality-of-the-circumstances test has 
the dexterity to account for all relevant concerns.277 Although courts dislike 
judging the value of speech on a sliding scale, just as courts dislike requiring 
officers to perform mental balancing tests on the scene, both tasks may be a 
necessary compromise to properly balance the First Amendment and Fourth 
Amendment issues at stake in a retaliatory arrest case.278 
 
 
268.  See generally Allen, 815 F.3d 239 (describing the factual circumstances of a particular retaliatory 
arrest claim). 
269.  See supra Part VI.A (noting that the Supreme Court disfavors valuating speech, despite having the 
ability to consider the value of speech in First Amendment analysis). 
270.  See supra Part VI.A (discussing that political speech, such as a protest, has the highest value and 
protection in First Amendment jurisprudence).  
271.  See supra Part II.A (detailing Hartman’s effect of creating a no-probable-cause requirement for 
retaliatory prosecutions).  
272.  See supra Part II.B (analyzing the circuit split as to whether Hartman’s rule extends to arrests).  
273.  See supra Part II.B (noting that some courts have not addressed the issue of retaliatory arrests). 
274.  See supra Part II.B (stating the majority of courts impose a no-probable-cause requirement for 
retaliatory arrest claims). 
275.  See supra Part IV.B (delineating the chilling effect of First Amendment violations). 
276.  See supra Part V (discussing the deficiencies of the jurisprudence relevant to retaliatory arrests). 
277.  See supra Part VI (describing how a totality-of-the-circumstances test would function if applied to a 
retaliatory arrest claim).  
278.  See supra Part VI (analyzing the First and Fourth Amendment concerns at play in a retaliatory arrest 
claim and suggesting a way to balance those concerns).  
* * *
